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ABSTRACT:
How INTERNATIONAL IS 'INTERNATIONAL' LAW?
The international legal community posits universality as a central
characteristic of modern international law. But there has been little work
to assess the degree to which international legal norms are widely
shared and incorporated into the foreign policy-making of states. Previ-
ous work in this area has attempted to describe the distribution of legal
values across cultures. This work has proven contradictory and incon-
clusive. The epistemic communities literature suggests looking at the
distribution of practitioners as an alternative approach for assessing the
diffusion of norms and practices. In fact, the community of litigators
who practice before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) comes from
a very small set of Western states. While Western states utilize their
own staff lawyers when appearing before the ICJ, non-Western states
hire Western lawyers. International lawyers often identify the ICJ as the
premier institution of public international law. The failure of non-
Western states to produce their own lawyers for use at the ICJ raises
significant questions about their resources and motivation to incorporate
international law into their foreign policy-making. By these measures,
international law is not as 'international' as its name implies.
I. ASSESSING THE INTERNATIONAL CHARACTER OF LAW
American and international attention was focused on the growing
importance of international law by a recent case before the International
Court of Justice (ICJ) involving the Republic of Paraguay and the
United States. In that case Paraguay sought relief for the Paraguayan
citizen, Angel Francisco Breard, who faced the death penalty in the
United States for a murder committed in Virginia in 1992. Facing off
for the oral pleadings on April 7, 1998 at the Peace Palace in The Hague
were nine Americans and two Paraguayans. The oral pleadings took a
total of about three and a half hours. During that time roughly 23,500
words were spoken. Of these, 22,800 came from the mouths of the
Americans, while the laconic Paraguayans uttered just 700. The two
sides were not as lopsided as this might imply since three of the Ameri-
cans were arguing on Paraguay's behalf.'
1. Application of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Paraguay v. United
States of America) (oral pleadings, uncorrected verbatim transcripts), http://www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/idocket/ipaus/ipausframe.htm (last visited February 27, 2001). The presenta-
tion of the Paraguayan case took up some 9,800 words to 13,700 words for the American
case.
[Vol. 22:239
How International is International Law?
The case of Paraguay v. United States reflects a larger phenomenon
in the practice of international law. The most visible practitioners of
international law are predominantly from the United States and a hand-
ful of Western European countries. Despite this obvious imbalance,
international legal scholars frequently assert that international law is
"truly universal."2 In this article we document the extent of the Western
monopoly of international legal practice at the ICJ and argue that this
domination suggests that "international" law is not as international as
its name implies. This argument is important not just for its implications
concerning international law, but also for our broader theoretical under-
standing of the sources, spread, and survival of norms and ideas in
international relations.
The Western domination of international legal practice will not
come as a surprise to anyone who has studied ICJ proceedings. We pro-
vide here the first systematic description of who practices law at the ICJ
and advance an argument about its significance. Some will dismiss the
phenomenon we observe as simply a manifestation of legal specializa-
tion within a region that has a longer legal tradition. We will argue that
this is not an adequate explanation for the degree of imbalance we ob-
serve, and that if international law were truly an integral part of foreign
policy-making in most countries there would be many more appear-
ances of non-Western lawyers before the Court. But this is getting ahead
of our argument. We begin by looking at the universality claims made
by the international law community. We then set out a sociological ap-
proach to the study of legal norms that serves as the foundation for our
argument. Within this context, we present the systematic evidence of the
extreme Western bias in the distribution of international legal practice.
Finally, we return to a broader assessment of the implications of our
findings for the character and content of contemporary international
law.
A. The Universality of International Law
The question of whether international law is really "law" has been
frequently discussed.3 Our essential question is about the international
rather than the legal character of international law. Are internatibnal
legal norms and ideas genuinely shared throughout the system, or are
2. See, e.g., MICHAEL AKEHURST, A MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW
12-13 (6th ed. 1987); SHABTAI ROSENNE, THE WORLD COURT: WHAT IT IS AND HOW IT
WORKS 256 (1995); REBECCA M.M. WALLACE, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A STUDENT INTRO-
DUCTION 5 (1986)
3. See, e.g., Anthony D'Amato, Is International Law Really 'Law'?, 79 Nw. U. L.
REV. 1293 (1985).
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they a set of regulations that are primarily the province of a small group
of powerful states?
All legal systems assert universality within their given domain.4
Since international law takes as its domain the set of states in the inter-
national system, it is only natural that international legal scholars would
assert the global relevance of international legal principles. Nonetheless,
there have been some significant changes in the universalist conceptions
of international law over the past five centuries.
The philosophical roots of modern international law in the natural
law tradition provided an initial basis for the assertion of universality
Whether from a more humanistic standpoint, such as in the work of
Bodin and Gentili, or from the theological view of Grotius or the Span-
ish scholastics, Vitoria and Suarez, natural law was viewed as
potentially the same for all people in all places. The shift from natural to
positive international law in the late 18th century coincided with a
growing recognition that international law was not really international at
all. Instead, as Murray Forsyth notes, "there was a specific system of
'European public law,' which had spread to a few other parts of the
globe (the United States being the most obvious example), but else-
where forms of international behavior bore only a limited resemblance
to it."6 International law publications during this period reflected this
changing conception in their titles. During the late 18th and early 19th
centuries, the titles of major international legal publications "referred
expressly to the 'European' law of nations."7
Around the middle of the 19th century, universal aspirations again
came to the fore. Legal scholars and activists became increasingly will-
ing to assert the global relevance of a set of rules for international
interactions. Correspondingly, the use of the term "European law of na-
tions" was increasingly replaced by the term preferred by English and
American authors: "international law.",
8
4. See Pierre Bourdieu, The Force of Law: Toward a Sociology of the Juridical Field,
38 HASTINGS L.J. 805, 844-48 (1987) (Richard Terdiman trans., 1987).
5: See Murray Forsyth, The Tradition of International Law, in TRADITIONS OF INTER-
NATIONAL ETHICS 23 (Terry Nardin & David R. Mapel eds., 1992).
6. Id. at 36.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 37. In his discussion of the role of the 19th century American peace movement
in the development of international law, Janis provides another example of the Anglo-
American penchant for universalistic language. In 1843, the First Universal Peace Confer-
ence in London was attended by 292 delegates from the UK, 26 from the US, and just 6 from
continental Europe. Mark W. Janis, Protestants, Progress and Peace: Enthusiasm for an
Inernational Court in Early Nineteenth-Century America, in THE INFLUENCE OF RELIGION
ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 223, 235 (Mark W. Janis ed., 1991).
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In the twentieth century international lawyers continued to express
confidence in the genuine universality of international law. In 1921
James Brown Scott, the founding editor of the American Journal of In-
ternational Law, opined in the pages of that journal that the Permanent
Court of International Justice (PCIJ)-the precursor to the ICJ-had
realized "one dream of the ages" in its integration of different civiliza-
tions and systems of law. 9 Antonio Sanchez de Bustamante, one of the
original judges on the Permanent Court of International Justice, echoed
this spirit of optimism about the universality of international legal pro-
cedures in his 1925 assertion that: "[a]ll the races, all the continents, all
the forms of civilization are before the Court. Swiftly, and finally, the
conception and practice of law and justice in international relations has
conquered the world."'
In the rebuilding of the international system that followed World
War II, the PCIJ was replaced by the ICJ. Just as the PCIJ proved less
permanent than its name implied, so too post-war scholars and practi-
tioners came to see the PCIJ as less universal than had originally been
thought. With the dramatic expansion of the international system in the
process of decolonization, new standards for the meaning of the univer-
sality of international law were raised. C. Wilfred Jenks expressed the
essence of this new view:
[International law] can no longer be a projection of a group of
closely related legal systems based on the civil and common
law traditions, but must rest on the broader intellectual founda-
tions necessary to give it world-wide authority in an age which
is no longer prepared to accept the leadership of any one nation,
culture, ideology or legal system."
Alongside of these new standards, however, came the same asser-
tions that universality had at last been genuinely attained. Rebecca
Wallace writes in her introductory international law textbook
"[i]nternational law is no longer ... an exclusive western club.... The
European bias of international law has been destroyed. '" Mohamad
Shahabuddeen, a former ICJ judge, describes the PCIJ as having been
directed towards a European audience, 3 and endorses the universal
character of the ICJ:
9. James Brown Scott, The Election of Judges for the Permanent Court of Interna-
tional Justice, 15 AM. J. INT'L L. 556, 558 (1921).
10. ANTONIO SANCHEZ DE BUSTAMANTE, THE WORLD COURT 219 (1925).
11. ARTHUR LARSON & C. WILFRED JENKS, SOVEREIGNTY WITHIN THE LAW 3 (1965).
12. WALLACE, supra note 2, at 5.
13. MOHAMED SHAHABUDDEEN, PRECEDENT IN THE WORLD COURT 207 (1996).
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The Court was designed to be a World Court; it is now more
truly so than ever. The disciplined play within it of the different
legal cultures which compose it is essential to its capacity to
speak with the authority of the principal judicial organ of the
United Nations.4
Even some analysts who have emphasized the weak diffusion of
some parts of the international system have similarly endorsed the uni-
versal character of public international law as practiced before the ICJ.
Samuel Asante, for example, in a study of the practitioners of interna-
tional arbitration, argues that international commercial arbitration norms
have not effectively spread to African countries, but nonetheless accepts
that "the term 'World Court' which is used interchangeably with the
ICJ, is appropriate and well-merited."' 5
But, as this brief review has shown, international legal scholars have
long made universalist claims. How are we to assess whether the current
claims have more validity than the now discredited assertions of the
past? Previous arguments about the international character of interna-
tional law have tended to focus on the degree to which legal norms are
shared across different cultures. Jenks argues that there is already a
"common law of mankind."' 6 Surveying world legal systems, he con-
cluded that there is a robust base for international law across cultures. A
similar argument is advanced by R.P. Anand in a survey of legal atti-
tudes in developing countries.'7 Adda Bozeman, on the other hand,
reviews traditional Asian and African values and concludes that the lack
of legal norms is fundamental to these cultures and will limit their abil-
ity to be integrated into Western-style international relations.'8 James
Nafziger, conducting a similar review of the relationship between inter-
national law and distinctive religious beliefs, finds several important
areas where international law and cultural practices diverge, "For exam-
ple, prohibitions on whaling by national and international agencies ...
may conflict with indigenous religious practices. Prescriptions to protect
the rights of women ... have been rejected by some Islamic tradi-
14. Id. at 208.
15. Samuel K.B. Asante, The Perspective of African Countries on International Com-
mercialArbitration, 6 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 331, 348 (1993).
16. LARSON & JENKS, supra note 11.
17. R.P. ANAND, CONFRONTATION OR COOPERATION? INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (1986).
18. ADDA B. BOZEMAN, THE FUTURE OF LAW IN A MULTICULTURAL WORLD 163-72
(1971).
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tions."' 9 More generally, while international law scholars focus on the
commonalities, comparative law scholars tend to emphasize the diver-
sity of legal cultures. 0 David and Brierley, for example, argue that "The
Muslim world, India, the Far East and Africa are far from having ad-
hered to [Western civilization] without reservation. These countries
remain largely faithful to philosophies in which the place and function
of law are very different from what they are in the West.",
2'
The cultural analysis of the international legal environment has been
a valuable contribution to our understanding of the nature of interna-
tional law, but in addition to being inconclusive and contradictory, these
studies have not addressed the actual incorporation of international legal
norms into the preferences and practices of states.
B. The Sociological Approach to Legal Studies
Norms are a notoriously difficult area for empirical research. One
prominent literature in international relations theory has attempted to
gain empirical leverage on norms by looking at "epistemic communi-
ties." This literature emphasizes the role of groups of experts and
practitioners in the diffusion of norms. An epistemic community has
been defined as "a network of professionals with recognized expertise
and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to
policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue area."2 These
professionals share belief systems and "a common policy enterprise,"
which they engage in "out of the conviction that human welfare will be
enhanced as a consequence.'23 Epistemic communities do not merely
inform state action, but educate states by causing them to reevaluate
their interests.
Law is at its core a socially constructed phenomenon. Thus, the so-
ciological analysis of communities of practitioners is a relatively
common approach in the analysis of legal systems. 4 Although it has not
19. James A. R. Nafziger, The Functions of Religion in the International Legal System,
in THE INFLUENCE OF RELIGION ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 147, 151
(Mark W. Janis ed., 1991).
20. David Kennedy, New Approaches to Comparative Law: Comparativism and Inter-
national Governance, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 545 (1997).
21. RENt DAVID & JOHN E.C. BRIERLEY, MAJOR LEGAL SYSTEMS IN THE WORLD To-
DAY: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LAW 26 (Stevens & Sons 1978)
(1964).
22. Peter M. Haas, Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Co-
ordination, 46 INT'L ORG. 1, 3 (1992).
23. Id.
24. This strategy has been used in looking at private international law in the work of
Asante, supra note 15; YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE: INTER-
NATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF A TRANSNATIONAL
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been previously applied to public international law, the epistemic com-
munities approach is particularly appropriate for the analysis of
international legal norms. Practitioners play a critical role in the forma-
tion and articulation of international law. Former ICJ judge Sir Robert
Jennings asserts that practicing international lawyers "have much more
say in the shaping of international law... than do their counterparts in
domestic law making. '2 There is no hierarchical legislative or legal
system to formulate international legal principles. Instead, international
law depends critically on the practice of states and on the interpretation
of myriad formal and informal agreements between individual states.
States learn what international law is from the lawyers who practice it.
As we will argue at more length below, who practices international
law at the ICJ matters for at least two reasons. First, legal practitioners
compete to articulate particular visions of the law.26 Antonio Cassese
identifies different "segments of the world community" that not only
"have a different concept of international law and attribute a different
role to it, but they also endeavor to give it a shape according to their
own interests. 27 Cassese particularly singles out the concept of law in
the developing world, which he asserts is "profoundly distinct from that
predominating in the West., 28 Other scholars have emphasized the dis-
tinctive legal cultures of Asian and African states and the difficulties of
their integration into international law and legal practices.29 Anne-Marie
Slaughter makes a more general argument about the different perspec-
tives of liberal and illiberal states in their attitudes toward public
international law.30
LEGAL ORDER (1996)). Trubek and his co-authors point to the role of lawyers both in the
process of globalization and in the competition between different legal systems. David M.
Trubek et al, Global Restructuring and the Law: Studies of the Internationalization of Legal
Fields and the Creation of Transnational Arenas, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 407 (1994). For
a variety of other examples of this analytic approach, see KEVIN McGuIRE, THE SUPREME
COURT BAR: LEGAL ELITES IN THE WASHINGTON COMMUNITY (1993), ERWIN SMIGEL, THE
WALL STREET LAWYER: PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATION MAN? (1964), and JOHN FLOOD,
BARRISTERS' CLERKS: THE LAW'S MIDDLEMEN (1983).
25. Robert Jennings, International Lawyers and the Progressive Development of Inter-
national Law, in THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AT THE THRESHOLD OF THE 21ST
CENTURY 413, 414 (Jerzy Makarczyk ed., 1996).
26. Bourdieu, supra note 4; Dezalay & Garth, supra note 24; and Trubek, et al., supra
note 24.
27. ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A DIVIDED WORLD 393 (1986).
28. Id. at 117.
29. See, e.g., DAVID & BRIERLEY, supra note 21 at 28-29, 477-504; Asante, supra note
15; Whitmore Gray, The Challenge of Asian Law, 19 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. I (1995); Gabriele
Crespi-Reghizzi, Legal Aspects of Trade with China: The Italian Experience 9 HARV. INT'L
L.J. 85 (1968).
30. See Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, International Law and International Relations
Theory: A DualAgenda 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 205 (1993).
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We argue here that looking at the diffusion of practitioners also
matters because it sheds light on the diffusion of ideas and norms in in-
ternational law in particular and international relations more generally;
the bias in who practices international law reveals an underlying limita-
tion in the internalization of international legal norms among a large
number of states in the international system. As is argued in the epis-
temic communities literature, internalized norms should be carried by a
community of practitioners. The relative lack of non-Western legal
practitioners at the ICJ indicates a more systematic lack of international
legal expertise within non-Western foreign policy institutions. This in
turn suggests an important limitation on the potential for international
law to effectively constrain the behavior of states.
Before turning to these arguments in more depth, it is useful to
briefly consider the nature of legal procedures at the World Court, and
then to set out the fundamental data that serves as the foundation for our
argument.
C. Legal Procedures at the ICJ
The ICJ is the principal judicial organ of the United Nations. It
takes only a cursory review of any international law text to see that the
ICJ has played a central role in defining and interpreting international
legal norms. During its first half-century of operation-1948 to 1998-
the Court dealt with some 47 contentious cases, delivered 61 judgments
and offered 23 advisory opinions.3' While the court has no direct en-
forcement capabilities, the record of state compliance with its decisions
has been generally good.32 Excluding orders on provisional measures,
there were only four cases of non-compliance with the judgments of the
ICJ in this period.33 While it has not been the subject of significant study
in the international relations literature, the importance of the ICJ in the
scholarship on international law is largely taken for granted. Jeffrey
31. I.C.J., A GUIDE TO THE HISTORY, COMPOSITION, JURISDICTION, PROCEDURE AND
DECISIONS OF THE COURT, available at, http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/igeneralinformation/
ibbookBbookchapterl.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2001). For a detailed analysis of the recent
increase in the ICJ caseload, see D.W. BOWETT ET. AL., THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF
JUSTICE: PROCESS, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (J.P. Gardner & Chanaka Wickremasinghe
eds., 1997).
32. Enforcement of ICJ judgments rests with the Security Council. See U.N. CHARTER
art. 94, para. 2. On compliance with ICJ judgments, See COMPLIANCE WITH JUDGMENTS OF
INTERNATIONAL COURTS 7-46 (M.K. Bulterman & M. Kuijer eds., 1996).
33. These four cases are Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), which was recently settled fol-
lowing the collapse of the Stalinist government in Albania, Icelandic Fisheries (U.K. v. Ice.),
Iranian Hostages (U.S. v. Iran), and Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.). See
S.M. SCHWEBEL, Commentary, in COMPLIANCE WITH JUDGMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL
COURTS, supra note 32, at 39, 40-41.
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Kovar, a Deputy Assistant Legal Adviser in the U.S. State Department,
expresses a common view in the international law community when he
writes that the ICJ is "the premier international forum for the resolution
of international disputes. 34
Legal teams before the Court are led by agents, who act on behalf of
the governments they represent. An agent can be likened to "the head of
a special diplomatic mission with powers to commit a sovereign
State."3 Very often, the parties' ambassadors to The Hague are chosen
to serve as agents. Agents are aided by counsel and advocates who
"assist... in the preparation of the pleadings and the delivery of oral
argument."36 These subordinate team members are also selected by the
governments they represent. Counsel and advocates need not be citizens
of the states they represent, but "are chosen from among those practitio-
ners, professors of international law and jurists of all countries who
appear most qualified to present the view of the country that appoints
them. In practice, they form a group of specialists which was once fairly
limited, but which now is tending to expand."37
Cases are brought before the Court either as a result of a special bi-
lateral agreement between states, or by one state's unilateral application.
Parties to a case submitted by application may raise preliminary objec-
tions, which require hearings on whether the Court has jurisdiction over
the dispute. Parties may elect not even to appear before the Court, as
Iran did in United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, and
the United States did in the merits phase of Military and Paramilitary
Activities in and against Nicaragua. If the Court decides that it has ju-
risdiction, proceedings may continue even in cases of non-appearance.
Finally, third parties may request permission to intervene if they have
an interest in the outcome of a dispute between other states.
Once the case is underway, the proceedings themselves are divided
into written and oral stages. The oral proceedings follow the written,
and take place in public sittings at the Great Hall of Justice. The mem-
bers of each party's legal team present various aspects of their state's
34. Jeffrey D. Kovar, International Litigation: International Law & Resolution of Inter-
national Disputes, in CONTEMPORARY PRACTICE OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 221, 226
(Ellen G. Schaffer & Randall Snyder eds., 1997).
35. I.C.J., A GUIDE TO THE HISTORY, COMPOSITION, JURISDICTION, PROCEDURE AND
DECISIONS OF THE COURT, available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/igeneralinformation/
ibbook/Bbookchapter3.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2001). Rosenne describes agents as
essentially "political" figures. SHABTAI ROSENNE, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE INTER-
NATIONAL COURT, 1920-1996, at 1170-71 (3d ed. 1997).
36. I.C.J., supra note 35.
37. Id.
38. For a description of the ceremonial aspects of the oral proceedings, see ROSENNE,
supra note 2, at 128-29.
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case. Judges are allowed to pose questions to the speakers, but have
done so very rarely.39 When questions are asked, they tend to come at
the end of the proceedings and the legal teams are allowed time to pre-
pare responses.
Shabtai Rosenne, in a broad review of the functioning of the World
Court, has emphasized the importance of the oral proceedings:
One cannot fail to be struck by the close attention with which
the judges follow the oral statements, for they act as the focus-
ing point for the work of the Court in deciding the case, and
accordingly can have a great impact on the case. Skillful plead-
ing may not win a bad case, but it can mitigate the effect of a
negative decision.' °
Rosenne admits that the requirements of simultaneous translation can
have a "deadening effect" on the oral proceedings. "This notwithstand-
ing, it is still the hearing which has the most direct impact."
4'
Keith Highet, a lawyer who has himself appeared before the ICJ on
eleven different occasions representing ten different countries, has also
emphasized the importance of the oral proceedings:
[T]here is no question ... that the written proceedings are sub-
ordinate to the oral proceedings. Stilted, lengthy, and even
boring as the oral pleadings may be, it is in this phase that the
parties boil down their cases to the crucial points, that counsel
has to stand up and speak out, and that the judges form opin-
ions. The length, turgidity, complexity and repetitiveness of the
written pleadings make them hard for any but the most diligent
of judges (or counsel) to master. It is at the oral stage that push
comes to shove and that cases are, almost without exception,
won or lost, saved or frittered away. As Article 60, paragraph 1
of the Rules says, the purpose, and indeed the result, of the oral
proceedings is to bring out "the issues that still divide the par-
ties," and not "go over the whole ground covered by the
pleadings, or merely repeat the facts and arguments these con-
tain. ,2
39. I.C.J., A GUIDE TO THE HISTORY, COMPOSITION, JURISDICTION, PROCEDURE AND
DECISIONS OF THE COURT, available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/igeneralinformation/
ibbook/Bbookchapter4.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2001)..
40. ROSENNE, supra note 2, at 129.
41. Id.
42. Keith Highet, Book Review, 86 AM. J. INT'L. L. 400, 402 (1992). Highet's remarks
are in reaction to the assertion of Gill that the oral proceedings are less important than the
written proceedings. See TERRY D. GILL, LITIGATION STRATEGY AT THE INTERNATIONAL
COURT: A CASE STUDY OF THE NICARAGUA V. UNITED STATES DISPUTE 89-91 (1989).
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Once oral proceedings conclude, the Court deliberates privately, and
then delivers its judgment in a final public sitting in the Great Hall of
Justice.
II. THE DATA
In this project we compare the diffusion of international legal norms
among Western and non-Western states. We have adopted current
membership in the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Devel-
opment (OECD) as the criterion for identifying Western states. 3 This
measure is imperfect, but its deficiencies are biased against the case we
make here. Israel, Liechtenstein, and South Africa, for example, have all
appeared before the Court and are arguably "Western" despite not being
OECD members. To the extent that these countries have been able to
send legal teams of high national composition to the Court, their catego-
rization as non-Western should bias the results against our
expectations." Meanwhile, Japan, South Korea, and Turkey are OECD
members, yet are arguably non-Western. These states, however, have
not appeared before the ICJ, so their categorization as "Western" has no
impact on the main results presented here.
Our case data come directly from the Proceedings of the ICJ for the
first fifty years of the Court's operation, from 1948 to 1998. We have
examined every contentious case-brought either by application or
agreement-that included oral proceedings regarding preliminary ob-
jections, interim measures, permission to intervene, or merits.4 ' This set
of cases ranges from Corfu Channel (1948) to Fisheries Jurisdiction
(1998). We have also compiled data on the lawyers who participated in
43. Current OECD members (and their year of admittance): Australia (1971), Austria
(1961), Belgium (1961), Canada (1961), Czech Republic (1995), Denmark (1961), Finland
(1969), France (1961), Germany (1961), Greece (1961), Hungary (1996), Iceland (1961),
Ireland (1961), Italy (1961), Japan (1964), Korea (1996), Luxembourg (1961), Mexico
(1994), the Netherlands (1961), New Zealand (1973), Norway (1961), Poland (1996), Portu-
gal (1961), Spain (1961), Sweden (1961), Switzerland (1961), Turkey (1961), the United
Kingdom (1961), and the United States (1961). We use the term "Western" because it is
commonly used for this cultural denotation. Of course it is not a geographically perfect cate-
gorization. Given the exclusion of the Latin American states, "Northwestern" might be a
more appropriate appellation.
44. Israel and South Africa both sent purely national teams in their respective appear-
ances before the Court. Liechtenstein used one Swiss and three British lawyers in its 1954
appearance in the Notebohm case.
45. The complete list of cases is provided in the appendix. We have included cases in
which only one side appeared. Rosenne explains that "the Court has shown itself capable of
carrying out its task of reaching a decision despite the absence of formal pleadings and evi-
dence by one of the parties." ROSENNE, supra note 2 at 95.
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each sitting of the oral proceedings of these cases.4'6 The data include
information on forty-seven cases, involving fifty countries and 593 legal
team members, argued over the course of approximately 1,000 public
sittings.
It should be noted that in several cases documentation for some of
the sittings is unavailable. There are also eight cases that were too old to
have been detailed on the ICJ's website, yet too recent to be published
in the ICJ's Proceedings series. 47 The missing records prevent us from
tracking attendance over the entire course of the oral proceedings in
these cases, but we were always able to utilize records from the final
sittings, which are generally representative.
48
A. Legal Teams at the ICJ
In Figure One we summarize the national and non-national compo-
sition of the legal teams of the OECD and non-OECD states. Each
vertical bar represents the number of legal teams within each quintile
for the percentage of members of the team that are nationals. Of course,
every team includes at least one national. But the differences between
Western and non-Western states are clearly apparent in the figure. The
Western states tend to use teams with very high national composition,
while the non-Western states tend to use teams with relatively low na-
tional composition.
The differences between Western and non-Western states are more
succinctly summarized in Table One, which uses a 60 percent cutoff to
dichotomize the ICJ legal teams on the basis of their national composi-
tion. The strong relationship between OECD membership and national
composition of ICJ legal teams can be clearly seen in the main diagonal.
46. We focus exclusively on legal specialists-individuals with such designations as
"agent," "counsel," "advocate," "counsellor," "legal expert," and various combinations
thereof. Other team members, such as secretaries and witnesses, are excluded.
47. These cases include: Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Austl.), Maritime
Delimitation in the Area between Greenland and Jan Mayen (Den. v. Nor.), Territorial Dis-
pute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Chad), East Timor (Portugal v. Austl.), Arbitral Award of 31
July 1989 (Guinea-Bissau v. Senegal), Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El
Sal./Hond.: Nicar. intervening), the Merits phase of Military and Paramilitary Activities in
and against Nicar. (Nicar. v. U.S.), and Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Republic of Mali).
48. If there is any bias in only looking at the final sittings it should go against our ar-
gument since it is the hired non-nationals who sometimes do not show up at the last sitting.
A dramatic example of this is the lengthy Barcelona Traction case. The final sitting was
attended by only four lawyers, two from each side. Only one was a non-national. In contrast,
at the first sitting of this case, there were thirty-six lawyers present, seventeen of whom were
non-nationals.
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TABLE ONE
OECD MEMBERSHIP AND NATIONAL COMPOSITION OF ICJ LEGAL
TEAMS (1948-1998)
National OECD Non-OECD Total
Composition Member Member
60% or More 46 18 64
Less than 60% 4 29 33
Total 50 47 97
P('[1] > 31.13)=.000
Of the 185 states that are members of the United Nations, only sixty
have been parties before the ICJ. 49 Moreover, OECD states make up 35
49. I.C.J., supra 35. This covers the years between 1946 and July, 1996. U.N. member-
ship is as of 1998. Two states on the list of sixty (Turkey and Iceland), were named as
parties, but refused to participate. Two others (Lebanon and Egypt) were only involved in
cases that were terminated by discontinuance. For a discussion of some of the elements in
state decisions to utilize the ICJ, see Dana D. Fischer, Decisions to Use the International
Court of Justice, 26 INT'L STUD. Q. 251 (1982).
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percent of the parties that have appeared before. the ICJ, but only ac-
count for 16 percent of the states in the United Nations. Our argument is
that the bias in the nationality of international legal practitioners is an
indicator of the limited diffusion of international legal norms. To the
degree that the parties before the ICJ are the more legally-oriented states
in the system, our results should be understated. Those states that do not
even resort to the ICJ are presumably even less integrated into the inter-
national legal system. For example, the United States attempted to use
the ICJ to resolve several disputes with the Soviet Union concerning
incidents in which planes were shot at after straying into the airspace of
the Soviet Union or its satellites. In each of these cases the Soviets re-
jected ICJ jurisdiction. 0 Meanwhile, the Soviet Union never called on
the Court to resolve any of its disputes.'
The ICJ has been most notably underutilized by African and Asian
states.52 China, Japan, Korea, and Vietnam, for example, have never ap-
peared before the court. In the 1948 to 1998 period, there are only four
cases involving Asian states 3 Table Two shows the regional utilization
of the ICJ and the frequency of teams composed solely of national law-
yers.
The data presented in Figure One and in Tables One and Two make
a convincing case that non-Western states tend to have a greater pro-
portion of non-national representation in their appearances before the
Court. Nonetheless, there are a number of discrepant cases in the off-
diagonal. These discrepant cases fall into two categories: there are the
four cases in which Western states have had a relatively high proportion
of non-national representation; and there are the seventeen cases in
which non-Western states have had a low proportion of non-national
50. Treatment in Hungary of Aircraft and Crew of United States of America (U.S. v
Hung., U.S. v U.S.S.R.); Aerial Incident of October 7th, 1952 (U.S. v U.S.S.R., 1956); and
Aerial Incident of March 10th, 1953 (U.S. v U.S.S.R., 1956).
51. See GILL supra note 42, at 15-17. There is some evidence that Gorbachev was in-
terested in increasing Soviet involvement in the ICJ, but that experiment was cut short. See
NAGENDRA SINGH, THE ROLE AND RECORD OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 232-
33 (Martinus Nignoff Publishers, 1989). Earlier Soviet distrust of the ICJ is reflected in the
title of a 1950 article by a prominent Soviet jurist, E.A. Korovin, The International Court in
the Service of Anglo-American Imperialism cited in ROSENNE, supra note 2, at 258.
52. See R.P. Anand, Attitude of the Asian-African States toward Certain Problems of
International Law, in THIRD WORLD ATTITUDES TOWARD INTERNATIONAL LAW (F.E. Snyder
and S. Sathirathai, eds., 1987).
53. These four cases are: the dispute between Cambodia and Thailand over the Temple
at Preah Vihear in 1962; The Portugal v. India dispute in the Indian Territory case (1960);
Appeal Relating to the Jurisdiction of the ICAO (Pak. v India, 1972); and the Pakistani
POWs Case (Pak. v India, 1973). Table Two only shows 6 appearances before the Court
because India did not participate in the Pakistani POWs case.
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representation. We turn our attention to these apparent discrepancies
below.
TABLE Two
NATIONAL COMPOSITION OF ICJ LEGAL TEAMS BY REGION (1948-1998)
Region All-National Total Legal Percentage
Legal Teams Teams All National
Northern Europe 19 28 68%
North America 7 11 64%
Asia 3 6 50%
Middle East 1 4 25%
Oceania 1 5 20%
Latin America 2 12 17%
Southern & 1 12 8%
Eastern Europe
Africa 1 19 5%
1. Western Legal Teams with High Non-National Composition
There are four cases in which the legal team of a Western state had
a relatively high non-national composition. These cases are listed in Ta-
ble Three. Although these Western states had higher than expected
numbers of non-nationals on their legal teams, closer examination of the
actual work performed by these teams' members bears out our expecta-
tions.
In its particulars, the Belgian case corresponds most closely to our
anticipated results. A simple way to gauge the relative contributions of
various team members during oral arguments is to calculate the percent-
age of the total arguments-in pages-that they provided. As is
indicated in the final column of Table Three, of the 1,790 pages of oral
arguments made by the Belgian team in Barcelona Traction, 72 percent
were made by national lawyers. Furthermore, the non-national lawyers
on the Belgian team were all from Western Europe and Canada.
[Vol. 22:239
How International is International Law?
TABLE THREE
OECD LEGAL TEAMS WITH HIGH NON-NATIONAL COMPOSITION
Year Case Team % Non-Nationals % of Oral Argument
by Non-Nationals
1953 Ambatielos Greece 61% 100%
1964 Barcelona Belgium 53% 28%
Traction
1951 Fisheries Norway 50% 73%
1964 Barcelona Spain 42% 68%
Traction
In the other three cases, the use of non-nationals is more substantial.
Just as we have argued for the non-Western states, these outside experts
have played a central role in the legal proceedings. In the Fisheries case,
Maurice Bourquin-a Swiss lawyer-presented 73 percent of Norway's
oral arguments. Spain's seven non-national lawyers provided 1,014
pages of their team's 1,487 pages of argumentation in Barcelona Trac-
tion. In the Greek case, two non-nationals-Belgian Henri Rolin and
Britain's Frank Soskice-made all of the oral arguments. 4
These four discrepant cases highlight our use of a broad definition
for the category of "Western" states. In fact, the practice of international
law before the ICJ is a specialization concentrated in a mere handful of
states. Greece is surely a Western state by our definition, but there are
no Greek international lawyers who have made arguments before the
ICJ as non-nationals. In each of these cases the non-national lawyers
continue to come from the same small set of Western states. In these
ostensibly discrepant cases there is only one international lawyer from a
non-OECD state helping to represent an OECD state. In the Barcelona
Traction Case, Spain included the Uruguayan jurist Eduardo Jiminez de
Arechaga on its legal team. We will return later to the exceptional case
of Jiminez de Arechaga, who went on to become a judge on the court.
2. Non-Western Legal Teams with High National Composition
Most directly problematic for our argument are the eight cases in
which the legal team of a non-Western state had no non-national com-
position: Colombia in the 1950 Asylum case, Colombia and Cuba in the
1951 Haya de la Torre case (an extension of the 1950 Asylum case), Israel
in the 1959 Aerial Incident case, South Africa in the 1965 Southwest
54. The Greek agent merely introduced his team in a statement spanning barely half a
page. Observations of M. Lely, (Greece v. U.K.), I.C.J. Pleadings (Ambatielos Case) 300
(May 16, 1952).
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Africa case, India and Pakistan in the 1972 ICAO case, and Pakistan in
the 1973 Pakistani POWs case. These eight cases represent just six
states since Colombia and Pakistan each appear on the list twice. Cuba's
role in the Haya de la Torre case was relatively incidental. The Cubans
intervened as a third party into the Colombian-Peruvian asylum dispute
in order to make an assertion about regional asylum conventions. Cuba
sent only one representative-a Cuban-to present its brief case. Israel
and South Africa, of course, have a number of Western characteristics.
Perhaps India and Pakistan can be explained by their strong inheritance
of British legal traditions. As Rosenne explains, "Most of the newly in-
dependent States maintain at least to some extent the legal system
inherited from the former colonial power."55
This leaves Colombia as the most significant outlier. As we will
discuss at more length below, however, it is interesting to note that in
contrast to several other similarly positioned states, Colombia has long
had an active legal adviser's office within the foreign ministry. We
would posit that the existence of this exceptional case demonstrates that
when a non-Western state has an effective and well-integrated legal
staff it is possible for it to present its own case.
There are eight other cases in which the legal team of a non-
Western state was composed of greater than 60 percent (but less than
100 percent) nationals. These cases are listed in Table Four. As in the
exceptional Western cases we examined above, a more detailed inspec-
tion of the oral transcripts shows that the make-up of these teams is not
always representative of the division of labor between nationals and
non-nationals. The Western bias is more pronounced than is represented
simply by the nationality of the lawyers. The rightmost column in Table
Four again shows the percentage of the oral arguments made by the
non-national lawyers on the team. When non-Western states hire outside
legal representatives, they tend to rely strongly on those representatives
in the oral proceedings. For example, Gilbert Gidel, Peru's French law-
yer in Haya de la Torre, provided 79 percent of his team's nineteen
pages of oral argument. In the Asylum case Peru's French lawyer
Georges Schelle provided 79 percent of his team's sixty-six page oral
arguments. In the Northern Cameroons case 90 percent of Cameroon's
oral arguments were made by their non-national lawyer, Prosper Weil.
The Beligian lawyer, Henri Rolin, made 87 percent of the Iranian oral
arguments in th Anglo-Iranian Oil case.
Cameroon's co-Agent, Douala Moutomd, explicitly acknowledges a
division of labor in his opening presentation for the Cameroonian oral
55. ROSENNE, supra note 2, at 55.
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pleading in the 1998 Land and Maritime case: "It is neither among my
duties or my capabilities to refute the Nigerian Preliminary Objections
point by point; counsel for Cameroon will deal with that. ' 6 Western
states tend to use national lawyers throughout their oral presentation.
Non-Western states not only hire outside lawyers, but when their na-
tional representatives do appear they focus on historical, geographic,
and political factors. The purely legal arguments are most often left to
the non-national lawyers.
TABLE FOUR
NoN-OECD LEGAL TEAMS WITH HIGH NATIONAL COMPOSITION
Year Case Team % Non- % of Oral Argument
Nationals by Non-Nationals
1950 Asylum Peru 16% 79%
1951 Haya de la Torre Peru 16% 79%
1952 Anglo-Iranian Iran 22% 87%
1954 Nottebohm Guatemala 32% 85%
1963 N. Cameroons Cameroon 14% 90%
1985 Cont. Shelf Tunisia 40% 80%
1986 Frontier Dispute Mali 36% NA*
1990 Land.. Maritime El Salvador 36% NA*
1991 ArbitralAward Senegal 38% NA*
1998 Land/Maritime Cameroon 25% 57V t
* At the time of this research, The Mali, El Salvador, and Senegal cases had not yet had their full
proceedings published, and were not recent enough to appear on the ICJ web site. The percentage of
non-nationals in these cases comes from the final sitting.
t The percentage in this case is based on word counts (rather than page counts) because the
proceedings were only available on-line.
3. Non-National Lawyers Before the ICJ
An alternative standpoint from which to gain perspective on this is-
sue is to shift the focus from the legal teams to the individual lawyers.
When we look at the individual lawyers who have appeared before the
ICJ, the evidence remains equally dramatic. Table Five lists the states
that have produced lawyers who have served as non-nationals on ICJ
legal teams. Of the 148 lawyers who have served on foreign teams, only
six (4 percent) are citizens of non-OECD states. 7 Of the forty-four
56. Oral Pleadings of Cameroon, Land and Maritime Boundary (Cameroon. v. Nig.), at 37
(Mar. 5, 1998), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/icn/icncr/cnicr9803_
translation.htm, Mr. Moutomd's testimony (last visited Nov. 9, 2000).
57. The list is also overwhelmingly male, with only ten discernable female first names.
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lawyers who have appeared before the court representing a foreign
country more than once, only one is from a non-OECD state. When non-
national lawyers are hired, 77 percent of the time they have come from
just five countries: France, the United States, the United Kingdom, Bel-
gium, and Italy. Only eleven states have produced more than one lawyer
who has appeared as a non-national before the ICJ. Only nine states
have produced lawyers who have appeared more than once in that role.
TABLE FIVE
CITIZENSHIP OF NON-NATIONAL LAWYERS ON ICJ LEGAL TEAMS
(1948-1998)
OECD States
















Total -OECD 142 265
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TABLE FIVE (CONTINUED)
Non-OECD States









GRAND TOTAL 148 276
Table Six lists the ten lawyers who have represented foreign coun-
tries before the ICJ five or more times. Only two of these lawyers have
ever represented their own states before the ICJ. Bowett represented the
UK in the 1973 Fisheries Jurisdiction case and Rolin appeared for Bel-
gium in the 1964 Barcelona Traction case. The distinguished
Uruguayan jurist Eduardo Jimenez de Arechaga is the one non-OECD
standout in this list-and the only non-OECD citizen to have repre-
sented a foreign state more than once before the ICJ.
Jiminez de Arechega is clearly a significant exception to our argu-
ment. At the same time, he demonstrates the possibility of precisely the
process of diffusion we would expect to see more often. Jiminez de
Arechaga was born in Montevideo in 1918, and earned his Doctor of
Law at the University of Uruguay in 1942. He was a professor of inter-
national law at the Montevideo Law School, and went on to hold a
number of positions both within the Uruguayan government and in the
United Nations. He joined the Court as a judge in 1970, and was elected
President of the Court in 1976. Jiminez de Arechaga retired in 1979. In
three of his six appearances he represented an OECD state.58 Five of his
six appearances before the Court came after his retirement. Still, his
education in Uruguay coupled with his frequent appearances before the
58. Jiminez de Arechaga was part of the Spanish team that argued the Barcelona Trac-
tion case in 1964. He helped represent Australia in Certain Phosphate Lands in 1992, and
Denmark in its 1993 Maritime Delimitation case.
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Court as a non-national legal expert make him a significant but singular
outlier in our data.
TABLE SIX
NON-NATIONAL LAWYERS WITH FIVE OR MORE APPEARANCES
BEFORE THE ICJ (1948-1998)
Name Citizenship Appearances on
Foreign Teams
Derek Bowett United Kingdom 11
Keith Highet United States 11
Ian Brownie United Kingdom 9
Prosper Weil France 9
Richard Meese France 8
Elihu Lauterpacht United Kingdom 7
Eduardo Jimenez de Arechaga Uruguay 6
Alain Pellet France 6
Henri Rolin Belgium 6
Pierre-Marie Dupuy France 5
Although our analysis has been focused on the lawyers who practice
international law, a brief look at the backgrounds of the judges who sit
behind the bench provides further support for our argument that inter-
national legal norms are still relatively weakly diffused through the
international system.
B. The ICJ Judges
The first attempt to set up a standing international court with per-
manent judges faltered over the issue of the apportionment of judges by
nationality." At the 1907 Hague Conference the large states and small
states could not agree on a formula for the terms of judges that would
ensure the kind of diversity demanded by the smaller powers. This disa-
greement arose despite the American Secretary of State Elihu Root's
admonition to the American delegation that the new full time judges
"should be so selected from the different countries that the different
systems of law and procedure and the principal languages shall be fairly
represented."6
59. See ROBERT KLEIN, THE IDEA OF EQUALITY IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: THE
TENSION BETWEEN THE CONCEPT OF GREAT-POWER PRIMACY AND THE CONCEPT OF SOVER-
EIGN EQUALITY 83-87 (1966).
60. I.C.J., supra 31.
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The principles of national diversity and the representation of diverse
legal systems in the appointment of judges have been maintained in the
current rules for electing ICJ judges. Article 9 of the Statute of the ICJ
spells out the diversity emphasis:
At every election, the electors shall bear in mind not only that
the persons to be elected should individually possess the quali-
fications required, but also that in the body as a whole the
representation of the main forms of civilization and of the prin-
cipal legal systems of the world should be assured.6'
This basic principle is clearly followed in terms of nationalities. The
current roster of ICJ judges includes jurists from a broad range of states.
Seven of the current judges are from OECD states, and eight are from
non-OECD states. According to Shahabuddeen, the Court has succeeded
in ensuring diversity and representation: "To some extent in composi-
tion, but to an even greater extent in outlook, the Court as a whole has
been moving in the direction of keeping pace with the evolving charac-
ter and structure of the international community. 62
This appraisal may be overly optimistic. Rosenne observes that al-
though nationality and regional representation is a significant element in
the election of judges, "the representation of legal systems does not ap-
pear to constitute a major factor in the election process. 63 While the
judges may be influenced by their national philosophies, ideologies and
religions, they are usually trained in either continental Civil Law or An-
glo-American Common Law." It takes only a cursory look at the
backgrounds of the current judges to raise questions about the interna-
tional character of modern international law.
Tables Seven and Eight list the current OECD and non-OECD ICJ
judges respectively with their nationalities and educational back-
grounds. In both tables, schools in OECD states are indicated by
italicized bold text. All seven of the OECD judges in Table Seven have
been educated entirely in OECD states. But, as shown in Table Eight, all
but one of the non-OECD judges also received a significant part of his
legal education in an OECD state. The single exception is the Russian
judge, Vladlen Vereshchetin, who received his legal education at the
61. I.C.J. Statute, art. 9. See also ROSENNE supra note 2, at 54-62.
62. Mohamed Shahabuddeen, The World Court at the Turn of the Century, in THE IN-
TERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE: ITS FUTURE AFTER FIFTY YEARS 14 (A. Sam Muller, D.
Raic, and J.M Thurfnszky, eds., 1997).
63. ROSENNE, supra note 2, at 59.
64. Id. at 60.
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University of MOSCOW. Of the fifteen judges currently on the ICJ
bench, all but one of them received a significant part of his or her legal
education in OECD states.66 The OECD criterion is a little sloppy in
evaluating the Western educational connections of the ICJ judges, since
we might not want to include education in Hungary in the 1950s as
Western. Still, all but three of the fifteen judges received a significant
part of their legal training in just four countries: France, Germany, the
United Kingdom, and the United States.
TABLE SEVEN
ICJ JUDGES FROM OECD STATES:
NATIONALITY AND EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND
Name Citizenship Legal Education
Shigeru Oda Japan Law degree, Univ. of Tokyo
JSD, Yale Univ.
Dr. of Law, Univ. of Tohoku
Gilbert Guillaume France BA, law, Univ. of Paris
Dipl6me, Paris Institute of Pol. Studies
Diploma, Univ. of Paris
Gaza Herczegh Hungary BA, Ph.D., U. of Szeged (Hungary)
Carl-August Fleischhauer Germany First State Exam (Law), Heidelberg
Fulbright Scholar, U. of Chicago Law
School
Dr. jur., Heidelberg
Second State Exam (Law), Stuttgart
Rosalyn Higgins United Kingdom BA, LL.B. MA Cambridge
JSD, Yale
Pieter H. Kooijmans Netherlands Econ. B., LL.M. Dr. luris, Free U.,
Amsterdam
Thomas Buergenthal United States JD New York Univ.
LL.M, JSD Harvard
65. On this issue our use of OECD membership as a proxy for 'Western' may bias the
results in our favor. But even a more narrow view of the 'Western' category would only
change the results by one, removing G6za Herczegh-who received his education entirely in
Hungary-from the list. A more narrow definition of the West would also treat Shigeru
Oda's Japanese education differently, but his JSD from Yale University would keep him on
the list of Western educated judges.
66. Prott, writing in 1979, makes a similar point about the roster of judges up until
1979, all of whom but one had received some part of their legal training in a "Western-type
legal system." The one exception in that earlier period is Judge Wellington Koo who had no
formal legal training. LYNDELL V. PROTT, THE LATENT POWER OF CULTURE AND THE
INTERNATIONAL JUDGE 203 (1979).
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TABLE EIGHT
NoN-OECD ICJ JUDGES:
NATIONALITY AND EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND
Name Citizenship Legal Education
Mohammed Bedjaoui Algeria Diploma Univ. of Grenoble
Dr. of Law, Univ. of Grenoble
Raymond Ranjeva Madagascar BA, law, U. of Madagascar.
Diploma, Madagascar Nat'l School of Admin.
Trainee, Judicial Div., Conseil d'Etat, Paris
Advanced diploma, Pol. Sci. Univ. of Paris
Advanced diploma, Int'l Law, U. of Madagascar
Dr. of Law, Univ. of Paris
Shi Jiuyong China BA., Gov't and Public Law, St. John's U.,
Shanghai
M.A., Int'l. Law, Columbia U.
Abdul G. Koroma Sierra Leone LL.M., U. of Kiev
M.Phil. (Int'l Law), U. of London
Vladlen S. Vereshchetin Russia BA, Dr. Jur. Sc., Moscow Institute of Int'l
Relations
Gonzalo Parra- Venezuela BA, Juridical and Pol. Sci., Central U.
Aranguren Venezuela
LL.M., New York University
Dr. Law, Ludwig-Maximileans U., Munich
Francisco Rezek Brazil LL.B, D.E.S. U. of Minas Gerais
Dr., Sorbonne
Diploma in Law, Oxford
Awn Shawkat Jordan M.A., LL.M., Cambridge
AI-Khasawneh
Source (Tables Seven and Eight): ICJ Biographies at http://www.icpcij.orgicjwww/igeneralinformation/
igncompos.html (visited 1/28/01). Schools in OECD states are indicated by italicized bold text. The
exact title of the undergraduate degrees is not always made clear in the official biographies. In the inter-
est of space, we have substituted 'BA' where the exact title is not discernable.
III. Is INTERNATIONAL LAW "INTERNATIONAL"?
The reality of Western predominance in the practice of international
law before the ICJ is very clear. Does this predominance undermine the
international character of international law? Our consideration of this
question proceeds in four steps. We begin by outlining some of the im-
plications of the nationality of its practitioners on the character and
content of international law. We then look at the existing comparative
work on the role of legal advisers in the foreign policy process. We next
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confront the argument that the phenomenon we observe is merely a re-
flection of benign functional specialization. Finally, we set out some of
the positive reasons that states might want to use national lawyers be-
fore the ICJ.
A. Nationality and International Legal Norms
In a world governed by truly universal international legal norms the
nationality of lawyers and judges would be irrelevant. Cameroon could
be represented by a Belgian lawyer, and Belgium could be represented
by a Cameroonian lawyer. But as we have shown, the former happens
frequently, while the latter happens not at all. The overwhelmingly
Western character of the lawyers who appear before the ICJ suggests
that nationality is not yet irrelevant for the practice of international law.
The significance of the lack of national diversity in the practice of inter-
national law can be seen both theoretically and empirically.
Lawyers from different legal traditions compete to assert their legal
values at the international level.67 We have already set out an argument
that Western and non-Western states may have different perspectives on
the character and content of international law. One could go further to
point to the significant differences of perspective even within these two
groups, but the larger dichotomy is adequate for our purposes. We have
also already outlined the epistemic communities approach and the ar-
gument that legal norms are carried by individuals, and thus that the
characteristics of these individuals matters. International law is defined
by its practitioners. Where different perspectives on international law
are defined by national boundaries, states will want to have their own
practitioners to ensure that the law is defined in the ways that they pre-
fer.
There is a large body of literature on the relationship between repre-
sentatives and their clients. States want to choose experienced and
capable lawyers. But, precisely because of the gap between the knowl-
edge of the representative and that of the state, the state has to worry
about maintaining control over the representative. The extent to which
non-OECD states rely on hired non-national legal expertise is surprising
from this agency-theoretic perspective. A principal (the state) tries not
merely to secure the most skilled agent, but also to minimize "agency
losses"-the costs incurred by a principal as a result of an agent's fail-
ing to pursue fully the principal's interests.
67. DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 24, Trubek, et. al. supra note 24; Bourdieu, supra
note 4.
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Two important means of minimizing these losses are monitoring
and interest alignment. A closely monitored agent will be more likely to
carry out a principal's wishes. Monitoring can be difficult, however,
when the agent has specialized knowledge that the principal does not
share. When monitoring is difficult, interest alignment becomes more
important. If an agent's interests are congruent with the principal's, he
or she can be expected to act as the principal desires even in the absence
of close monitoring. As Pratt and Zeckhauser explain, "agency loss is
the most severe when the interests or values of the principal and agent
diverge substantially, and information monitoring is costly."68 Garth and
Dezalay describe just such a situation in the area of international com-
mercial arbitration. They suggest that Third World States are caught in a
bind because they lack adequate competence internally, but carry a sig-
nificant fear of dispossession by the experts they have to hire to
represent them internationally.69
From the agency-theoretic perspective, an ideal legal representative
for a state appearing before the ICJ would not only be a skilled interna-
tional lawyer, but a lawyer whose actions can be monitored, or whose
interests are aligned with those of the state he or she represents. All
things being equal, national lawyers in regular government service
should be more easily monitored and are more likely to share their
state's interests. The advantages of relying on such agents are nicely
summarized by Pratt and Zeckhauser: "Those who share one's objec-
tives tend to carry them out; monitoring and conflict are reduced, and
such people may even make themselves available at a cheaper price."70
1. Finally, there is empirical evidence from other contexts that states
care intensely about the nationality of their representatives. It is difficult
to imagine, for example, a state sending a non-national to represent its
interests before the United Nations. States take the nationality of the
individuals in international organizations very seriously. As we saw
above, states demand geographic diversity in the selection of ICJ
judges. The International Law Commission-a UN organization
charged with the progressive development and codification of interna-
tional law-uses a quota system to ensure diverse regional
representation.7 Herbert Briggs notes that "the basic requirement that
the commission shall be persons of recognized competence in interna-
tional law has, on occasion been minimized in the preoccupation with
68. JOHN W. PRATT & RICHARD J. ZECKHAUSER, PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS: THE STRUC-
TURE OF BUSINESS 5 (1985).
69. DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 24, at 66-69, 96-97.
70. PRATT & ZECKHAUSER, supra note 68 at 15.
71. IAN SINCLAIR, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION 15 (1987).
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political and geographical factors."" Similarly, Article 101 of the
United Nations Charter calls for "as wide a geographical basis as possi-
ble" in the staffing of the United Nations. Houshang Ameri has asserted
that the "principles contained in Article 101 continue to be perhaps the
most discussed, and therefore sensitive, principles contained in the to-
tality of the U.N. Charter."73 The intense concerns of non-Western states
about the implementation of the diversity principle in international or-
ganizations has not translated into a willingness to use their own
nationals to represent them before the ICJ.
B. Legal Advising in Non-Western States
There are, then, a number of reasons why states should care about
the nationality of their legal representatives. The Western bias in inter-
national legal practice at the ICJ tells us something significant about the
distribution of capacity to participate fully in the international legal
system. The relative paucity of non-OECD lawyers who appear before
the ICJ reflects directly on the international legal infrastructure within
non-OECD states.
If international law were truly international, we would expect all
states to need a cadre of international lawyers to help them make effec-
tive use of international law and the international legal system.74 They
should be training their own international lawyers to work within their
foreign policy establishment, both to help them stay within the bounds
of law, and to take advantage of the law where opportunities arise. For-
eign office staff lawyers should be specialists on the issues that most
affect their countries. We would expect to see these staff lawyers show
up more often and make a more significant contribution before the ICJ.
There have been only a few attempts to directly assess the nature of
legal advisers in the foreign policy machinery of states. The American
Society of International Law (ASIL) sponsored a small conference of
legal officials and scholars from twelve countries in 1963." Although
quite dated, this study still offers several conclusions that suggest sup-
port for the argument we make here. For example, the authors assert
that calling upon "distinguished lawyers from outside the government
establishment, including lawyers from foreign countries.., especially
72. Quoted in Id. at 16.
73. HOUSHANG AMERI, POLITICS OF STAFFING THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARIAT 151
(1996).
74. See Antonio Cassese, The Role of Legal Advisers in Ensuring that Foreign Policy
Conforms to International Legal Standards 14 MICH. J. INT'L L. 139 (1992).
75. H.C.L. MERILLAT, LEGAL ADVISERS AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS (1964). Participants
came from Argentina, Canada, Colombia, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, the Netherlands, Nige-
ria, the Philippines, the United Arab Republic, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
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[occurs] in countries where there is not yet a group of experienced in-
ternational lawyers."76 The study also asserts that "the tendency...
appears to be to concentrate more and more on legal advising and legal
representation in the regular government establishment."" But, as is
noted in the study, "the evolution of a legal advisory service in foreign
affairs, commanding respect and to which matters of highest importance
are entrusted, is naturally related to the availability of highly competent,
well-trained, and experienced lawyers within the country, and within the
government of the country."78
In the details of the ASIL report it becomes clear that the non-
OECD participants exhibited relatively weak institutions for incorpo-
rating international law into foreign policy. For Malaysia and Nigeria,
this could be attributed to their only recent acquisition of full sover-
eignty. In both of those states there was no explicit legal adviser within
the foreign ministry. Instead the foreign ministry had to solicit opinions
from the ministry of justice, which was tasked with dealing with all as-
pects of law, both domestic and international, and thus was not a part of
day-to-day foreign policy making.79 But even in a long-established state
like Mexico, the institutionalization of legal advice in foreign policy
making was described as problematic, "There does not exist, in a direct
manner, a separate organization for legal advice or planning in matters
pertaining to foreign policy. '80 The problems of incorporating interna-
tional law into the making of foreign policy are identified as stemming,
"in the first place... from a general evil, namely the lack of experts in a
sufficient number."8'
The Philippines did have an Office of Legal Affairs within the De-
partment of Foreign Affairs, but its legal focus is open to question,
given that it was tasked not only with "providing legal assistance, as
required by other offices and divisions of the Department" but also,
among other things, with providing general research services to the
other departments, collecting biographic information that could help in
the formation and implementation of foreign policy, the translation of
all communications received in foreign languages, the editing of all
documents published by the Department, the enlargement and mainte-
nance of the Department's library, and the compilation and maintenance
of the official history of the Department and of the foreign affairs of the
Philippines!
76. Id. at 29.
77. Id. at 29-30.
78. Id. at 30.
79. Id. at 67-70 (Malaysia) and 84-89 (Nigeria).
80. Id. at 72.
81. Id. at 75.
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Colombia, on the other hand, did have a specific legal office in the
Foreign Affairs Ministry. As we saw above, it is one of the handful of
non-OECD states that have appeared before the ICJ without non-
national representation. In both of its 1950's appearances before the
court, Colombia used only Colombian lawyers, and a significant part of
its oral arguments were presented by the legal adviser himself.
More recently, Antonio Cassese has attempted to assay the role of
legal advisers in disciplining foreign policy. Cassese describes the
"traditional" role of legal advisers in representing their states in interna-
tional litigation." But his study is also limited to a small number of
states." He readily admits that resources prevented him from extending
the research to a significant sample of non-Western states, and that the
non-Western states proved less willing to participate in the study. Only
three non-OECD states were included in his sample-Brazil, Bulgaria,
and Israel-and Brazil and Bulgaria receive only passing mention in the
analysis.
Cassese also points to the problem of assessing the impact of legal
offices through interviews with only a handful of individuals from each
state.85 Different participants often tell different stories about the devel-
opment and implementation of foreign policy. The fact that a state has a
legal advisers office does not mean that it uses the office in an effective
way-as several participants in Cassese's study were quick to point out.
Switzerland, the United States and the United Kingdom are singled out
as having legal advisers who are well integrated into the foreign policy
process. Cassese suggests that the critical factor is size: "most large
countries tend to effectively integrate legal staffs into their foreign
ministries. 86 "Countries with small legal staffs often relegate them to
more purely bureaucratic roles."87 He does not provide a direct ac-
counting so it is difficult to assess this assertion. Of the three states he
explicitly describes as having well-integrated legal advisers, the U.S. is
clearly a large country, but Switzerland is as clearly small. Brazil has
more than twice the population of the U.K., but is criticized along with
Ireland, Italy (which has roughly the same population as the U.K.),
82. Cassese, supra note 74, at 142.
83. Cassese's sample included Brazil, Bulgaria, Ireland, France, Hungary, Israel, Italy,
the Netherlands, Switzerland, the U.K. and the U.S. Id. at 140.
84. Id. at 141.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 160.
87. Id. at 149. One cannot help suspect that the causality runs the other way here: coun-
tries that relegate their international lawyers to more purely bureaucratic roles tend to have
smaller legal staffs.
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Hungary, Bulgaria, and Israel for having too few international lawyers
in their foreign ministries."
Although limited by the small numbers of states that could be sur-
veyed, and by the problems of assessing true impact beyond the label on
an organizational chart, both the ASIL and the Cassese studies empha-
size the importance of the legal advising function for the legal constraint
of foreign policy-making, and lend support to our assertion that the non-
Western states may have limited domestic resources for participation in
the international legal system.
This same institutional weakness can be more broadly observed in
the data on legal practitioners before the ICJ. The primary critique of
this argument will be that the bias we document is simply a form of be-
nign functional specialization. It is to this important critique that we
now turn.
C. The Question of Specialization
In principle, lawyers are advocates without underlying loyalties. It
may be that foreign lawyers are hired because of the need for special-
ists. Few of us would venture before a tax court without taking along an
attorney who specializes in taxation. Here the old adage that someone
who engages in self-representation "has a fool for a client" comes to
mind. States want to find the best lawyers that are available, and these
tend to be a small number of Europeans and Americans. Rosenne offers
this basic explanation: "There has grown up over the years a small
group of international lawyers, drawn mainly from the legal professions
of Belgium, England, France, Italy, Switzerland and the United States,
who have specialized in practice in the International Court."89
1. The Supreme Court as Analogue
A starting point for thinking about the specialization argument is to
draw a comparison to legal practice before the U.S. Supreme Court. The
Supreme Court Bar is clearly a highly specialized form of legal practice.
It can be dangerous for a litigant to go before the Court without a repre-
sentative steeped in its special kind of legal practice.9° In Supreme Court
oral proceedings, the lawyers have just thirty minutes to make their
case. Furthermore, they must make this case in the face of a style of
vigorous questioning from the bench that gives the process a character
88. Id. at 167.
89. ROSENNE, supra note 2, at 120.
90. McGUIRE, supra note 24, at ch. 1.
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that one practitioner has likened to "walking into a buzz saw."9' The
style of argument and kinds of issues that are raised before the Supreme
Court are also significantly different from those of the lower courts.92
Thus, there are strong incentives for specialization in the Supreme Court
bar.
Supreme Court practice has been described as dominated by Wash-
ington lawyers.93 Nonetheless, this domination is nothing like the
concentration we have documented in ICJ practice. During the 1986-87
Supreme Court session, just 8.2 percent of the Supreme Court bar came
from Washington.94 Adding New York, Chicago, Los Angeles, and San
Francisco, the top five cities still account for less than 30 percent of Su-
preme Court practice.9 This compares to the 71 percent of ICJ non-
national practitioners who come from just three countries: France, the
United States, and the United Kingdom.96
The Supreme Court analogy is even more telling for our argument
when we break Supreme Court practice down by the kind of litigant.
The highly specialized Supreme Court practitioners are almost always
representing private parties. The most relevant comparison set for our
argument is those cases in which an American state has been repre-
sented before the Court. Between 1950 and 1997 American states were
parties before the Supreme Court sixty-three times. In all but five of
those cases (92 percent) the state's oral argument was made by a state
official, rather than a hired specialist. 97 Even the smallest American
states have staffs tasked with managing their legal affairs. When those
affairs take the state before the High Court, it is the state's own legal
staff that stands before the bench.
A central lesson of the Supreme Court analogy-that there are dif-
ferences between private parties and state actors-has a broader
relevance for thinking about international relations. On this issue, as
many others, the analogy between states and individuals is flawed. Re-
turning to our previous example, most individuals have neither the need
nor the resources to keep a tax lawyer occupied year round. States do
have the resources to keep international lawyers on the payroll if they
view that as a priority. If states want to incorporate international law
91. Id. at 49.
92. Id. at 1-6.
93. Id. at 128-70.
94. Id. at 38.
95. Id.
96. See, supra Table Five.
97. Data compiled from LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE UNITED STATES (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds.)
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into the process of developing and evaluating foreign policy, we would
expect them to have the necessary international legal specialists on staff.
2. The Limits of Functional Specialization
The specialization argument also fails to hold up under more careful
scrutiny of the individual cases. Most importantly, an informed look at
the list of the lawyers who appear most often as "hired guns" (Table
Six) shows that most of these advocates are generalists, rather than spe-
cialists. Elihu Lauterpacht, for example, is the author or editor of books
on a wide range of international legal issues. Keith Highet has published
American Journal of International Law summaries of a wide range of
legal decisions; reviews of books on intervention in the ICJ, and on
compulsory jurisdiction before the ICJ; a review of a general interna-
tional law textbook; and a review of a book by Elihu Lauterpacht on the
administration of international justice. Prosper Weil has published arti-
cles on "normativity" in international law, and on the right of the Court
to refuse judgement on unclear cases (the non liquet principle).
It might be argued that these lawyers are specialists at arguing be-
fore the ICJ, rather than specialists in particular substantive areas of the
law. Keith Highet, for example, has described the ICJ bar as:
those international lawyers who have practiced and continue to
practice as oral advocates before the Court, who represent a va-
riety of foreign states other than their own governments, who
are well-known to the Judges and Registrar of the Court, who
know how things work out in practice, and who understand by
experience the difficulties, pitfalls and tricks of the trade.98
Of course, by dint of their considerable experience these eminences
are specialists at appearing before the ICJ. Keith Highet has himself
been involved in nearly a quarter of the contentious cases that have
come before the ICJ. But this functional argument would predict that all
states would utilize specialists for this process. It cannot account for the
fact that Western states tend to use their own counsel, while non-
Western states rely on the ICJ bar. The most prominent ICJ specialists,
as listed in Table Six, have been called on to represent their own states
only two times. They have represented non-Western states twice as of-
ten as they have represented the OECD states.
Moreover, given the nature of ICJ proceedings it is not obvious that
specialization in ICJ oral presentations would be very functional.
98. Keith Highet, A Personal Memoir of Eduardo Jiminez de Arechaga: Doyen of the
Invisible Bar of the International Court, 88 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. MTG. PROC. 577, 579
(1994).
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Although important, oral argument is just one part of the overall pres-
entation of a case before the ICJ. Oral arguments are almost always
prepared statements that are simply read verbatim without the spirited
kind of back and forth that one sees, for example, in the United States
Supreme Court.99 The oral phase in most ICJ cases has been conducted
with no questions from the bench at all. When the judges do have ques-
tions to ask of the advocates, they usually hold their questions until the
end of the oral presentations and allow the lawyers time to prepare a
written response.' ° There is little reason, then, to expect the system to
evolve into one in which some lawyers specialize in presentation, as you
find in a domestic legal system where the vagaries of the jury system
require a class of lawyers with a flair for flamboyant or emotive pres-
entation.' °' Keith Highet, while arguing for the importance of the oral
proceedings admits that they are usually "stilted" and "boring."'
0 2
It may be a different kind of flamboyance that non-Western states
are seeking to purchase. States may present their cases through a distin-
guished professor of international law from Oxford or Yale in order to
legitimatize their arguments in the eyes of the Court. But what would it
say about the universality of international law to suggest that the Court
can be influenced by the European lineage of the lawyers before it? The
possibility that it takes a Western legal scholar to legitimate an oral
presentation at the ICJ would only strengthen our argument that inter-
national law is seen as the special purview of a small number of
Western states.
Specialization itself, therefore, cannot explain the domination of ICJ
practice by a handful of American and European lawyers. Even if we
accept that states will seek specialized experts as their advocates before
international tribunals, we would still expect to see a broader interna-
tional distribution of these experts. If international law were truly
international, the specialization argument would lead us to expect to see
some Indian or Nigerian lawyers representing Belgium or the Nether-
lands. The assertion that non-Western states simply do not have the
99. See GILL, supra note 42, at 90. Sir Robert Jennings, a former ICJ judge, explains
that "[t]he needs of the simultaneous translators encourage, if not almost require, virtual
recital of a prepared text." quoted in ROSENNE, supra note 35, at 1319. On the difficulty of
Supreme Court oral arguments, See McGUIRE, supra note 24, at 49-52.
100. See, e.g., the questions asked at the end of Libya v. U.K., (oral pleading, CR97/24.
10/22/97) http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/iluk/ilukcr/iluk_icr9724.htm (visited 11/9/00).
As Rosenne observes, "It is not customary to interrupt a speech with questions, but questions
are sometimes put when there is a break in presentation. The traditional coffee-break about
half way through a session often affords an opportunity for this." ROSENNE, supra note 35, at
1340.
101. See ROSENNE, supra note 2, at 129.
102. Highet, supra note 42, at 402.
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resources, infrastructure, legal traditions, language skills, or whatever to
have an adequate level of indigenous legal expertise for representation
before the ICJ only makes our case for us.
D. The Case for National Representation
Thus far, we have made the case that benign functional specializa-
tion is not an adequate explanation for the geographic bias we have
identified in ICJ practice. A case can also be made for the functional
advantages of using national representatives to present arguments be-
fore the ICJ. Derek Bowett, who sits with Keith Highet on the top of our
list of hired specialists, recommends the use of national lawyers:
So far as the lawyers are concerned, a strong "internal" element
is always desirable. This increases the government's confidence
in the team and also makes the presentation of the case in Court
more impressive, adding to the perception that the case is im-
portant to the government.' 3
Bowett suggests two distinct logics for national representation. In
the first place, as we discuss above, principle-agent problems can be
minimized with the strong participation of a state's own lawyers. The
arguments made before the ICJ help define international legal norms. If,
as we have suggested is likely, non-OECD states have distinctive beliefs
about those norms, they should feel more comfortable being represented
by lawyers whose own beliefs they can more easily monitor. Dezalay
and Garth suggest just such a dynamic in the evolution of private inter-
national law. In that realm too, they suggest that there is a dearth of
national lawyers to represent Third World countries.'O Third World
states must turn to outsiders, but are concerned that they will not be able
to control their legal representatives. 5 To deal with this agency prob-
lem, non-Western countries tend to rely on a coterie of what Dezalay
and Garth call "turncoat" lawyers who express more sympathetic legal
doctrines.' °6 It is unlikely that anyone would use that label to describe
the likes of Derek Bowett, Keith Highet, or Ian Brownlie.
Bowett's second logic is that the use of national lawyers sends a
signal to the Court about the state's attitude toward the case and inter-
national law more generally. Unlike the increasingly bare-knuckled
litigation in international arbitration described by Dezalay and Garth,' 7
103. BOWETT et al., supra note 31, at 13.
104. Dezalay & Garth, supra note 24, at 66.
105. See id. at 68-69.
106. See id. at 71.
107. See generally, DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 24.
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this would seem a relatively safe strategy for ICJ oral presentations. The
oral presentations, which are usually read verbatim, can always be re-
viewed, or even written by hired specialists. Even if states hire outside
counsel to help them prepare their cases and to deal with the procedural
nuances of the ICJ, there is no reason for them not to put their own na-
tionals before the Court in the oral proceedings.
Given both the limited functional advantages of hiring Western spe-
cialists and the positive benefits of using national lawyers to make a
significant part of the oral presentations before the ICJ, we can only
conclude that their absence in this forum points to a broader shortage of
international legal expertise within the foreign policy institutions of
non-Western states. The practice of international law remains the prov-
ince of a small group of Western specialists. The notion that
international legal norms have attained a genuine universality is belied
by this state of affairs.
E. Prospects for Change
The dominance of Western legal expertise in the formation and
conduct of international law in the past may not be an accurate indicator
of future developments. In a review of its first fifty years of operation,
the ICJ pointed to the small group of non-national lawyers who have
appeared before the Court, and argued that it is expanding.' 8 This may
be true, but it primarily reflects the increasing use of non-national law-
yers by non-Western states. There has been no increase in the use of
non-Westerners to argue before the Court. Indeed, the non-Western
states have gone from legal teams with an average composition of about
45 percent non-nationals in the 1960s to an average of about 60 percent
non-nationals in the 1980s and 1990s.' 09 There is no trend towards in-
creasing reliance on national lawyers by the non-Western states. Indeed,
the last time a non-Western state appeared before the court without
Western legal representation was in 1973-a quarter of a century ago.
Nor is there any evidence that either Western or non-Western states are
prepared to rely on non-Western legal advisors.
While appearances before the ICJ do not suggest any strong trends
in the use of non-national lawyers in international law, there is one
leading indicator that may suggest some greater diffusion in the practice
of international law in the future. Each year the American Society for
International Law sponsors an international moot court competition for
108. I.C.J., supra 35.
109. These two periods cross a gap in the 1970's when there was very little use of the
Court in general, and in the few cases the Court did hear, the non-Western states (India and
Pakistan) used all national lawyers.
[Vol. 22:239
How International is International Law?
international law students. Between 1960 and 1980 the Jessup competi-
tion went from being a purely American contest to having a genuine
international component. " ° Between 1970 and 1980 the number of for-
eign teams participating increased from six to twenty-eight. Still,
American teams won every year between 1960 and 1980 except for
1976, when a team from the University of Toronto took the top spot.
Between 1981 and 1998, however, American teams have only won four
times. The expansion of international legal expertise is suggested in the
results of the past eighteen years, as presented in Table Nine. While still
largely dominated by the OECD states, teams from countries outside the
OECD have managed to defeat American and European teams at the
competition in recent years. A Singaporean team was victorious twice in
the 1980s. In the past five years non-OECD teams have had three victo-
ries compared to only two for the OECD. Furthermore, the two
victorious OECD teams were from Australia and Mexico rather than
from Western Europe or the United States.
The trends in the Jessup Moot Court Competition are probably the
strongest indicator that international legal expertise is beginning to dif-
fuse. That more countries are producing international lawyers, and that
these new lawyers are succeeding in an important international legal
competition would seem to offer some basis for the expectation that in-
ternational law may become more genuinely international in the future.
In the meantime, however, these talented new international lawyers and
the professors who have taught them remain on the sidelines at the ICJ.
TABLE NINE
JESSUP INTERNATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION WINNERS:
1981-1998
Year Winner OECD Number of
Countries Entered
1981 Australia Nat'l U. Y 29
1982 Nat'l U Singapore N 23
1983 U. Kansas Y 25
1984 Dalhousie (CAN) Y 28
1985 Nat'l U. Singapore N 36
1986 Boston College Y 26
1987 Georgetown Y 39
1988 u. Melbourne Y 43
its history is available at:110. Information about the Jessup competition and
http://www.ilsa.org (last visited Nov. 9, 2000).
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TABLE NINE (CONTINUED)
Year Winner OECD Number of
Countries Entered
1989 U. British Columbia Y 41
1990 U. Georgia (US) Y 42
1991 U. Saskatchewan Y 31
1992 U. Paris Y 22
1993 U. Melbourne Y 36
1994 U. Singapore N 33
1995 U. Philippines N 40
1996 U. Sydney Y 44
1997 U. Catolica Andres Bella Venezuela N 38
1998 U. Nacional Autonoma de Mexico Y 48
CONCLUSIONS
The Spanish neo-scholastic Francisco de Vitoria tried to articulate a
vision of international law that could apply to South American Indians
as well as the Spanish. He argued for the use of natural law instead of
community norms as the foundation for international law. But, as has
happened so often throughout history, he made the mistake of assuming
that what were in fact the norms of a particular community were univer-
sal manifestations of natural law. He therefore concluded that the
Indians were violating law, rather than concluding that European no-
tions of natural law required reexamination. "' The evidence we present
here suggests that contemporary theorists of international relations and
international law are in danger of making a similar error.
For the past three centuries international legal scholars and practi-
tioners have been asserting the universal character of international law.
Since 1945, scholars and advocates have been making increasingly bold
claims about the effectiveness of international law and its potential to
regulate state action based on its universal character. In this same pe-
riod, however, there has been relatively little effort to measure or even
to describe the effective internationalization of international legal prac-
tice. We have argued that the clear Western bias in legal practice before
the ICJ is one such measure. At a minimum, we have presented a clearer
description and fuller accounting of the Western bias in ICJ practice
I 11. JAMES TURNER JOHNSON, JUST WAR TRADITION AND THE RESTRAINT OF WAR: A
MORAL AND HISTORICAL INQUIRY 75-78 (1981).
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than has been heretofore available. Of course, we have tried to go much
further than this to argue that by this measure there are significant limi-
tations in the diffusion and internalization of international legal norms.
This is not necessarily a claim that international law is unimportant in
the international system. As Jepperson, Wendt and Katzenstein explain,
"norms may not be widely held by actors but may nevertheless be col-
lective features of the system-either by being institutionalized (in
procedures, formal rules, or law) or by being prominent in public dis-
course of a system.""' According to our analysis, this may be an apt
description of the present status of international legal norms.
That international law has emerged from the Western legal tradition
is well known. What is novel in our presentation is the empirical dem-
onstration of the degree to which the practice of international law
remains connected to the Western states and the argument that this con-
tinuing Western bias tells us something significant about the nature of
international law. The mores and principles of international law have
not yet diffused to other cultures with sufficient robustness for them to
train and use their own legal expertise.
There is nothing wrong with the Western foundation for interna-
tional law per se. It is not our purpose to argue that international law
needs to be some kind of cultural amalgam. International law could be
the simple extension of some particular national legal tradition to a
worldwide scale. Our argument is that the weak diffusion of legal prac-
tice is an effective indicator of the limited international character of
international legal principles.
Given its Western foundations, it may not be surprising that lawyers
who reside in the West continue to dominate international legal practice.
But the weak diffusion of international legal practice ultimately
suggests limitations in the diffusion of international legal norms, and a
constraint on the effectiveness of international law. Recognition of this
situation is particularly important for those who most earnestly call for
an expansion of legalism in the relations of states.
The title of this article is in the form of a question. It is meant to be
a provocative one. We have argued that the answer to this question one
gets from looking at the practice of international law at the ICJ is that
international law is still not very international. Because the ICJ is a par-
ticularly important and visible international legal institution, whom
states choose to represent them before the ICJ is a potent indicator not
merely of where international legal expertise currently resides, but also
of where international legal norms have been most strongly internalized.
112. Ronald L. Jepperson, et.al., Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security, in
THE CULTURE OF NATIONAL SECURITY 54 n. 69 (Peter J. Katzenstein, ed. 1996).
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From the evidence of ICJ practice we have imputed the possibility that
non-OECD states put a relatively low priority on international law in
their foreign policy-making practices. This imputation will be contro-
versial, not simply for its logical basis, but also because it is not often
that the argument is made that the world needs more lawyers. But in
international relations, the alternative to lawyers is often soldiers-a
national resource for which Western and non-Western states have dem-
onstrated a similar enthusiasm."'
Hopefully, our argument will open a debate and provoke others to
look more directly at the role of law in foreign policy-making practices
and to propose alternative measures of the international character of
international law. We look forward to a more thorough consideration of
this important issue. In the meantime we reiterate the importance of
caution given the long-recognized danger that international law will be
misperceived as more international than it really is. Writing in 1795,
Robert Ward criticized the notion of international law as a universal
normative construct:
Rejecting therefore the laws of Nature and Reason (as the sole
foundation of the law of Nations) because we do not conceive
them powerful or fixed enough to bear the fabric that is erected
upon them; we conclude that what is commonly called the law
of nations, is not the law of all nations, but only such sets or
classes of them as are united together by similar religions, and
systems of morality."'
Two hundred years later, the evidence we have adduced suggests
that the practice of international law remains the province of a handful
of Western states. For the large majority of states in the international
system, international legal expertise appears to be something they have
to purchase abroad, rather than an indigenous capability that can serve
as a regular part of their own foreign policy-making processes. Until
more states develop sufficient in-house expertise, it will be difficult for
international law to serve as a robust and universal constraint on inter-
national behavior.
113. As of 1994, the non-OECD states that have appeared before the ICJ spent an aver-
age of 3.5% of their GDP on military spending, compared to 2.6% for the OECD states. See
STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, YEARBOOK OF WORLD ARMA-
MENTS AND DISARMAMENT 359-78 (1996).
114. Quoted in Forsyth, supra note 5, at 35.
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APPENDIX
PERCENTAGE OF NON-NATIONAL REPRESENTATION
ON ICJ LEGAL TEAMS
Case Legal Team Year % Non- OECD
National
Corfu Albania 1948 71 0
Corfu UK 1948 0 1
Asylum Colombia 1950 0 0
Asylum Peru 1950 16 0
Anglo-Iranian Oil UK 1951 0 1
Fisheries Norway 1951 50 1
Fisheries UK 1951 0 1
Haya de la Torre Colombia 1951 0 0
Haya de la Torre Cuba 1951 0 0
Haya de la Torre Peru 1951 16 0
Anglo-Iranian Oil Iran 1952 22 0
Morocco France 1952 0 1
Morocco US 1952 0 1
Ambatielos Greece 1953 61 1
Ambatielos UK 1953 0 1
Minguiers-Ecrohos France 1953 0 1
Minguiers-Ecrohos UK 1953 0 1
Monetary Gold France 1954 0 1
Monetary Gold Italy 1954 0 1
Monetary Gold UK 1954 0 1
Nottebohm Guatemala 1954 32 0
Nottebohm Liechtenstein 1954 74 0
Norweigian Loans France 1957 0 1
Norweigian Loans Norway 1957 0 1
Infants Netherlands 1958 0 1
Infants Sweden 1958 35 1
Interhandel Switzerland 1958 0 1
Interhandel US 1958 0 1
Aerial Incident Bulgaria 1959 48 0
Aerial Incident Israel 1959 0 0
Frontier Land Belgium 1959 0 1
Frontier Land Netherlands 1959 0 1
Arbitral Award Honduras 1960 42 0
Arbitral Award Nicaragua 1960 56 0
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PERCENTAGE OF NON-NATIONAL REPRESENTATION
ON ICJ LEGAL TEAMS (CONTINUED)
Case Legal Team Year % Non- OECD
National
Indian Territory India 1960 56 0
Indian Territory Portugal 1960 33 1
Preah Vihear Cambodia 1962 67 0
Preah Vihear Thailand 1962 53 0
Cameroons Cameroon 1963 14 0
Cameroons UK 1963 0 1
Barcelona Traction Belgium 1964 53 1
Barcelona Traction Spain 1964 42 1
Southwest Africa Ethiopia 1965 77 0
Southwest Africa Liberia 1965 52 0
Southwest Africa South Africa 1965 0 0
North Sea Shelf Denmark 1968 33 1
North Sea Shelf Germany 1968 29 1
North Sea Shelf Netherlands 1968 25 1
Jurisdiction of the ICAO India 1972 0 0
Jurisdiction of the ICAO Pakistan 1972 0 0
Fisheries Jurisdiction Germany 1973 0 1
Fisheries Jurisdiction UK 1973 0 1
Pakistani POWs Pakistan 1973 0 0
French Nuclear Testing Australia 1974 12 1
French Nuclear Testing New Zealand 1974 0 1
Aegean Sea Greece 1976 40 1
Diplomatic and Consular US 1980 0 1
Cont Shelf: Libya-Tunisia Libya 1982 69 0
Cont Shelf: Libya-Tunisia Tunisia 1982 42 0
Cont Shelf: Libya-Malta Italy 1984 11 1
Cont Shelf: Libya-Malta Libya 1984 75 0
Cont Shelf: Libya-Malta Malta 1984 75 0
Gulf of Maine Canada 1984 35 1
Gulf of Maine US 1984 0 1
Military and Paramilitary Nicaragua 1984 71 0
Activities
Military and Paramilitary US 1984 0 1
Activities
Revision of Continental Libya 1985 78 0
Shelf
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PERCENTAGE OF NON-NATIONAL REPRESENTATION
ON ICJ LEGAL TEAMS (CONTINUED)
Case Legal Team Year % Non- OECD
National
Revision of Continental Tunisia 1985 40 0
Shelf
Frontier Dispute Burkina Faso 1986 63 0
Frontier Dispute Mali 1986 36 0
Elettronica Sicula Italy 1989 28 1
Elettronica Sicula US 1989 40 1
Land, Island and Maritime El Salvador 1990 36 0
Frontier
Land, Island and Maritime Honduras 1990 50 0
Frontier
Land, Island and Maritime Nicaragua 1990 43 0
Frontier
Arbitral Award of 31 July Guinea-Bissau 1991 67 0
1989
Arbitral Award of 31 July Senegal 1991 38 0
1989
Certain Phosphate Lands Australia 1992 33 1
Certain Phosphate Lands Nauru 1992 50 0
Maritime Delimitation Denmark 1993 17 1
Maritime Delimitation Norway 1993 38 1
Territorial Dispute Chad 1994 79 0
Territorial Dispute Libya 1994 79 0
Territorial Questions Bahrain 1994 89 0
Territorial Questions Qatar 1994 71 0
East Timor Australia 1995 40 1
East Timor Portugal 1995 38 1
Lockerbie: Libya-U.K. Libya 1997 55 0
Lockerbie: Libya-U.K. UK 1997 0 1
Lockerbie: Libya-U.S. Libya 1997 55 0
Lockerbie: Libya-U.S. US 1997 13 1
Consular Relations Paraguay 1998 50 0
Consular Relations US 1998 0 1
Fisheries Jurisdiction Canada 1998 10 1
Fisheries Jurisdiction Spain 1998 25 1
Land and Maritime Cameroon 1998 25 0
Boundary I I
Land and Maritime Nigeria 1998 62 0
Boundary I
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Mean Percent
non-national
Median Percent
Non-National
OECD .15 0
Non-OECD .44 .50
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